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Abstract: We provide a quantitative assessment of the welfare cost of tax competition or, 
equivalently, the welfare benefit of international tax policy cooperation. We use a simple 
multi-country general equilibrium model of a world economy, in which there are two 
types of cross-country spillovers: the first one is generated by international capital 
mobility and the second by the presence of an international public good. In the absence of 
international public goods, although welfare in the non-cooperative case is typically 
lower than in the cooperative case, the welfare difference is negligible quantitatively. 
Things change drastically, both quantitatively and qualitatively, once we introduce 
international public goods. Now, there can be big benefits from cooperation and welfare 
effects cease to be monotonic.  
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I. Introduction  
 
One of the main results in international economics is that non-cooperative (Nash) 
national tax policies lead to a race-to-the-bottom and suboptimal outcomes. Hence there 
is need for international cooperation. Such arguments become stronger as the degree of 
economic integration increases and tax competition becomes fiercer.1   
But recent quantitative studies using general equilibrium models with Ramsey-type 
policymakers indicate that the welfare gains from coordinated tax policies are not 
significant quantitatively (see e.g. Mendoza and Tezar, 2005, and Sørensen, 2004). In 
most of these studies, the welfare gains from coordination are around one percent of GDP 
and remain robustly “small” across different model specifications and policy scenarios.2  
In this paper, we reexamine the quantitative welfare implication of international tax 
cooperation. The difference from most of the related literature is that we incorporate an 
international public good, namely a public good whose benefits can extend beyond 
national boundaries (see Bjorvatn and Schjelderup, 2002, and Tabellini, 2003). As 
Tabellini (2003) pointed out, such goods constitute an important factor of the EU. 
Examples include foreign/defense policy and environmental quality. In addition, the 
abolition of borders between EU member states has generated a status of increased cross-
country spillovers in several areas such as internal security, border controls, immigration 
policy and scientific research. We show that the incorporation of international public 
goods in a model of international tax competition changes the above mentioned results 
drastically. 
We use a multi-country version of the general equilibrium model in Persson and 
Tabellini (1992). This is simple, tractable and delivers an analytical solution. There are 
two types of cross-border spillovers. The first one is generated by international capital 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1992, 1995) who also review the literature. The standard race-to-the-
bottom result is usually derived in a setup where the only cross-country spillover effect, or externality, is 
generated by international capital mobility and national policy instruments are chosen by Ramsey 
(benevolent) policymakers. A similar setup is used here. Note that international cooperation can become 
counter-productive if we depart from Ramsey policymakers and there are failures at policymaking level. 
Here we do not study such issues so cooperation is superior to non-cooperation. See Razin and Sadka 
(1999) for various political-economy aspects of tax competition. For empirical evidence of tax competition 
in OECD countries, see e.g. Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2008). 
2 What is “small” or “large” is of course arbitrary. One percent gain may be considered to be large enough. 
The key point, however, is whether the welfare gain from cooperation changes substantially across 
different model specifications. Here we show that it does, once we introduce international public goods.  
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mobility and results in the problem of tax competition for mobile tax bases. The second 
spillover is generated by the presence of international public goods and results in the 
problem of free riding on other countries’ contribution.  
When we solve the model numerically to get a measure of general equilibrium 
welfare, our results are as follows. In the absence of international public goods, the 
welfare gain from cooperation is small quantitatively. The reason is that higher tax rates 
(as we switch from Nash to cooperation) is good for public goods provision in the short 
run, but they are bad for private investment and in turn future consumption. The latter 
offsets the beneficial effect of higher public goods provision in the short run. Thus, in a 
non-static setup, suboptimally low Nash tax rates are not that bad quantitatively, as 
already shown by e.g. Mendoza and Tezar (2005).  
Results change drastically once we introduce international public goods. Although, as 
mentioned above, we realize that what is small or large is arbitrary and we should be 
cautious how to read these numbers, it is fair and robust to claim that: (a) The 
introduction of international public goods into a rather conventional model with 
international capital mobility makes the welfare gain from cooperation particularly big. 
Thus, the argument for international cooperation becomes much stronger when there are 
public goods that extend beyond national borders.  (b) The combination of the two 
spillovers has qualitative implications too: the welfare gain from cooperation is 
nonmonotonic in the magnitude of cross-country spillovers from international public 
goods; after a turning point, the welfare gain falls with this magnitude (see also Bjorvatn 
and Schjelderup, 2002, for similar effects on tax rates).  
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section II solves for a world competitive 
equilibrium. Section III solves for optimal policies. Section IV concludes. 
 
II. World economy  
 
Consider a world economy composed of a finite number of identical countries N ,  
indexed by Ni ,...,2,1= . Each country i  is populated by a representative private agent 
and a benevolent Ramsey national government. The private agent in each country 
consumes and invests at home and abroad, where investment abroad implies a mobility or 
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transaction cost (the latter provides a measure of the degree of capital mobility). The 
national government in each country can tax domestic and foreign investors at the same 
rate (source principle of taxation) to finance the provision of a public good whose 
benefits can extend beyond national boundaries.  
We use a simple two-period (present and future) model adapted from Persson and 
Tabellini (1992). The differences are that here we use a multi-country version of this 
model and add an international public good as in Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002). All 
countries produce the same commodity and have access to a linear technology.   
The sequence of events is as follows. In the beginning of the game, national 
governments choose once-and-for-all their tax policy and the associated contribution to 
the public good. In turn, private agents maximize their lifetime utility making their 
investment and (present and future) consumption decisions. Working with backward 
induction, we first solve the private agents’ problem by taking prices and policies as 
given. This will give us a World Competitive Equilibrium (WCE) which is for any 
feasible policies. In turn, we solve for Nash national tax policies. Namely, each national 
government chooses its own tax rate optimally subject to the WCE by taking as given the 
tax policies of the other government. We also solve for cooperative national policies; this 
will serve as a benchmark.    
 
II.1 Behavior of private agents 
The representative household in each country i  maximizes: 
 
1 2( , , )
i i i iU U c c G=                                                                                                            (1a) 
 
where 1
ic  and 2
ic  are private consumption in the first and second period respectively, and 
iG  is the international public good from the viewpoint of private agent located in country 
i  (see equation (5) below). The utility function is increasing and quasi-concave. For 
algebraic simplicity, we use an additively separable function of the form:  
 
iiii GccU ν++= 21log                                                                                                      (1b) 
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where ν  is the weight given to public services relative to private consumption.3 
The first-period budget constraint of the private agent in country i  is: 
 
1
( ) 1
N
i ii ij i
j i
c k k e
≠ =
+ + =∑                                                                                                        (2a) 
 
that is, the private agent begins with an exogenous endowment, ie , and uses this 
endowment for consumption, ic1 , investment at home, 
iik , and investment in other 
countries ij ≠  denoted as ijk .   
The second-period budget constraint of the private agent in country i  is:  
 
2
2
( ) 1 ( ) 1
( )(1 ) (1 )
2
ij ijN N
i i i ii j j ij
j i j i
m kc t A k t A k
≠ = ≠ =
= − + − −∑ ∑                                                       (2b) 
 
where 0 1it< <  and 0 1jt< <  are income tax rates in countries i  and ij ≠  respectively, 
the parameters 0iA >  and 0jA >  are the exogenous capital returns in i  and j  
respectively, and 0≥ijm  is a measure of transaction costs when an investor located in i  
invests in ij ≠  (as said above, ijm  provides a measure of international capital mobility, 
where 0=ijm  implies perfect mobility and ∞→ijm  zero mobility).   
Private agents act competitively by taking policy variables as given. Substituting 
(2a) and (2b) into (1b), the first-order conditions with respect to iik  and ijk  give 
respectively (these are Euler-type equations):  
 
1
1 (1 )i ii t Ac
= −                                                                                                                    (3a) 
                                                 
3 In the numerical solutions below, we set 1ν > . This parameter range is needed to get a well-defined 
solution in general equilibrium, namely when policies are optimally chosen. In particular, we need 1ν >  to 
get that the tax rate increases with the initial endowment (see Appendix). With a linear production 
technology, a higher endowment increases the tax base on a one-to-one basis (see equation (6e) below). We 
thus need to value the public good a lot in order to make an efficient use of the higher tax revenue. See 
below about parameter values used in the numerical solution.  
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ijijjj
i kmAtc
−−= )1(1
1
 for ij ≠                                                                          (3b) 
 
so that (1 ) (1 )i i j j ij ijt A t A m k− = − − . Thus, without uncertainty, net returns are equalized. 
 
II.2 National government budget constraint   
Each national government i  spends ig  on a public good by taxing domestic and foreign 
investors at the same rate, 10 << it . Thus, assuming a balanced budget, the budget 
constraint of national government in country i  is: 
 
iiii kAtg =                                                                                                                         (4) 
 
where 
( ) 1
N
i ii ji
j i
k k k
≠ =
= + ∑  denotes the total capital stock in country i  ( jik  is the capital 
invested in country i  by investors located in country ij ≠ ).  
 
II.3 International public good 
To model the international public good iG , as defined in (1a)-(1b) above, we follow e.g. 
Alesina and Wacziarg (1999) and Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002), by assuming:  
 
( ) 1
N
i i j
j i
G g b g
≠ =
= + ∑                                                                                                          (5) 
 
where the parameter 10 ≤≤ b  measures the strength of international spillovers in public 
good provision. When 0=b , there is no spillover and the public good is national or local. 
When 1=b , there are perfect spillovers and the public good is fully international.   
 
 
 
 
 
 6
II.4 World Competitive Equilibrium (given policies) 
We now solve for a World Competitive Equilibrium (WCE) for any feasible policy. As 
equation (4) shows, only one of the two policy instruments ( g  and t ) can be set 
independently in each country. We choose to express the WCE in terms of national tax 
rates ( t ). Then, it is straightforward to show that (2)-(4) imply: 
 
1
1
(1 )
i
i ic t A
= −                                                                                                                   (6a) 
2
2
( ) 1 ( ) 1
( )(1 ) (1 )
2
ijN N
i i i ii j j ij ij
j i j i
kc t A k t A k m
≠ = ≠ =
= − + − −∑ ∑                                                (6b) 
( ) 1
( )
N
i i i ii ji
j i
g t A k k
≠ =
= + ∑                                                                                                   (6c) 
(1 ) (1 )j j i iij
ij
t A t Ak
m
− − −=                                                                                               (6d) 
( ) 1
1
(1 )
N
ii i ij
i i
j i
k e k
t A ≠ =
= − −− ∑                                                                                            (6e) 
 
where (6a), (6b), (6c), (6d) and (6e) give respectively the first-period consumption, the 
second-period consumption, government expenditure on the public good, capital invested 
abroad and capital invested at home. This is for each country Ni ,...,2,1= . 
We sum up this section. We have solved for a World Competitive Equilibrium 
(WCE). This holds for any feasible policy as summarized by the national tax rates, it , 
where Ni ,...,2,1= . In this equilibrium: (i) private agents maximize their utility; (ii) all 
constraints are satisfied; (iii) all markets clear. This WCE is given by (6a-e) and (5). 
Notice that, thanks to the model specification, we have managed to get closed-form 
solutions for equilibrium allocations as functions of it  and parameters only. This will be 
convenient algebraically when we endogenize policy, it .  
Before we move on to optimal policies, it is helpful to identify the nature of 
external effects from foreign tax policy on domestic welfare. Recall that there are two 
types of cross-border spillovers in the model: spillovers from international capital 
movements and international public goods. International capital movements generate the 
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standard tax competition effect (if the foreign country increases its tax rate, the domestic 
country attracts capital) and the tax-the-foreigner effect (if the foreign country increases 
its tax rate, it also hurts the income and welfare of domestic investors who invest abroad). 
International public goods generate a free riding effect (if the foreign country increases 
its tax rate, it contributes to the provision of the global public good). The tax competition 
and the free riding externalities are both positive and hence will both tend to push the 
uncoordinated tax rate below its Pareto efficient value. The tax-the-foreigner effect can 
be negative or positive depending on whether the domestic country is exporter or 
importer of capital and hence can work in either direction.4 We leave the solution below 
to determine the net final externality and hence how Nash and cooperative policies may 
differ.   
 
III. National policies and world equilibrium 
 
We move on to the first stage of the game and endogenize national policies, it . National 
policies are chosen by benevolent national governments that either play Nash or 
cooperate. When they choose it , benevolent national governments take into account the 
World Competitive Equilibrium specified above. We will solve for symmetric (Nash and 
cooperative) equilibria in national policies. Thus, in equilibrium, i jt t t= ≡ , 1 1 1i jc c c= ≡ , 
2 2 2
i jc c c= ≡ , ii jjk k k= ≡ , 0ij jik k= ≡ , i jg g g= ≡ , where i j≠ .5  
 
III.1 Nash policies  
Each national government i  chooses it  to maximize (1b) subject to (6a-e) and (5). In 
doing so, it takes jt , with ij ≠ , as given. Using equations (6a-e) and (5) into (1b), 
deriving the first-order condition for it , invoking symmetry, and assuming existence of 
an interior solution we get (we now omit country superscripts): 
 
                                                 
4 These three effects can be also shown algebraically if we differentiate the domestic welfare with respect 
to the foreign tax rate. The partial is a bit unfriendly but one can distinguish the three effects. Results are 
available upon request from the authors.   
5 Even if, in a symmetric equilibrium, there are no capital flows ex post (see equation (6d)), decisions are 
affected ex ante and this is enough to capture the inefficiencies in the absence of cooperation.   
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2
2
1 1 2 ( 1)(1 )  
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
t A t N bA e v A e
A t A t t m
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ − −− = − − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− − −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
                                        (7) 
 
which is an equation in the Nash tax rate only. Comparative statics can show that the 
Nash tax rate, denoted as nct , follows ( , , , , )nct t N b m v e
− + + + += .6 If in turn we use nct  into 
(6a-e) and (5), we get a symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE).   
 
III.2 Cooperative policies  
Consider now the reference case in which national tax policies are chosen jointly by 
maximizing the sum of individual countries’ welfare. That is, a worldwide benevolent 
social planner chooses jointly all it  to maximize the sum of (1b) over all countries. 
Working as above, it is straightforward to show that in Symmetric Cooperative 
Equilibrium (SCE), we have instead of (7):  
 
2
1 1[1 ( 1)]   
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
tA e v b N A e
A t A t t
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− = + − − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− − −⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
                                                   (8) 
 
which is an equation in the cooperative tax rate only. Comparative statics can show that 
the cooperative tax rate, denoted as ct , follows ( , , , )ct t N b v e
+ + + += .7 If in turn we use ct  
into (6a-e) and (5), we get a symmetric cooperative equilibrium (SCE).  
 
III. 3 Comparison of SNE to SCE   
Numerical solutions are reported in Tables 1-5 below. These Tables report the 
equilibrium tax rates, the associated macroeconomic outcomes and the resulting general 
equilibrium welfare, in both the non-cooperative and cooperative case, for various 
parameter combinations. To get welfare in the non-cooperative case, we solve equation 
(7) for the Nash tax rate, use this solution into (6a-e) and (5), and in turn plug the 
                                                 
6 See Appendix A for details.  
7 See Appendix B for details.   
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resulting values of Gcc ,, 21  into the welfare function (1b). We work similarly with the 
cooperative case in which the tax rate is given by equation (8).  
We are mainly interested in the effects of the key parameters, 0≥m  and 
10 ≤≤ b , where recall that 0≥m  is a measure of international capital mobility and 
10 ≤≤ b  is a measure of international spillovers in public goods provision. Tables 1a and 
1b report respectively the case in which there is either international capital mobility only, 
or international public goods only. By contrast, Tables 2a and 2b report the cases in 
which both types of cross-border externalities coexist. Specifically, Table 1a sets 0=b  
(i.e. no international public goods) and studies what happens for changing values of 
0≥m , while Table 1b sets ∞→m  (i.e. zero capital mobility) and studies what happens 
for changing values of 0 1b≤ ≤ . Table 2a studies what happens for changing values of 
m  in the presence of international public goods (say 0.1b = ), while Table 2b studies the 
effects of changing  values of b  in the presence of international capital mobility (say 
0.1m = ). 
 
Tables 1a-b and 2a-b here 
 
There are six results below. Results 3, 4 and 6 give the key points of the paper, 
while Results 1, 2 and 5 confirm that the model also delivers the main results in the 
literature.8  
 
Result 1. In all cases, the Nash tax rate is less than, or equal to, the cooperative tax rate 
(i.e. 10 <≤< cnc tt ). Also, welfare under Nash is less than, or equal to, welfare under 
cooperation. Only when we set m→∞  and 0=b  in Table 1a (i.e. neither international 
capital mobility, nor international public goods, so that the economies are practically 
closed), the two solutions coincide. In all “interior” cases ( ∞<≤ m0  and/or 0>b ), the 
Nash tax rate is found to be sub-optimally low. This means that the existing cross-country 
                                                 
8 We use Mathematica, version 4.00. Apart from 1>ν , results are robust to changes in parameter values. 
We also report well-defined solutions only (for instance, we do not report solutions for tax rates higher than 
one or negative capital stocks). This is not unusual: computable general equilibrium models work for some 
range of parameter values.    
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spillovers (from international capital movements and international public goods) generate 
a net positive externality.9  
 
Result 2. It is useful to start with quantitative results in the popular special case in which 
there are no international public goods. This is the case in Table 1a. In the absence of 
international public goods ( 0=b ), the welfare difference between the non-cooperative 
case and the cooperative case is relatively small. This happens even when the tax rates 
differ a lot between the two cases. For instance, when the mobility cost is 1=m , the 
Nash tax rate is 298.0=nct , while the socially optimal tax rate is 0.715ct = . 
Nevertheless, despite this big difference in tax rates, the utility levels are pretty close: 
871.101)( =nctU  in the Nash case versus ( ) 104.646cU t =  in the cooperative case, so 
that the welfare gains from coordination are 2.7 percentage points.  
 The intuition behind this result is revealed by looking at macroeconomic 
outcomes. Recall that utility depends on both private consumption and public good 
provision (see equation (1b)). Our numerical simulations imply that higher tax rates (as 
we switch from Nash to cooperation) can be good for public good provision, but are 
particularly bad for second-period private consumption. This happens because higher tax 
rates hurt private investment and in turn future private consumption (see equation (6b)) 
so that the beneficial effect of higher tax rates gets smaller. Therefore, in a dynamic 
setup, Nash tax rates are not that bad quantitatively. This is different from a static model, 
where higher tax rates can increase the provision of public goods without hurting the 
economy in the future. The standard argument - that tax competition is harmful in the 
presence of cross-country spillovers - becomes weaker in a dynamic setup.  
Finally, in Table 1a, the effect of m  is monotonic, in the sense that as capital 
mobility rises and tax competition gets fiercer (i.e. as m  gets smaller), the difference 
between the two (Nash and cooperative) tax rates and hence the gain from cooperation 
rise. This monotonic effect also holds in the presence of international public goods (see 
Table 2a below), i.e. it holds for any value of 0 1b≤ ≤ .      
                                                 
9 Recall the game-theoretic result: in the presence of positive (resp. negative) externalities, players 
strategies are inefficiently low (resp. high) in a Nash equilibrium relative to a cooperative equilibrium. See 
Cooper and John (1988) and for an extension Philippopoulos and Economides (2003). This applies to 
symmetric equilibria. 
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Result 3. Consider now the symmetrically opposite case from the one described above. 
Namely, there is zero capital mobility ( m→∞) so that it is only public goods that 
generate cross-border spillovers. This case is reported in Table 1b. The benefits from 
cooperation become bigger than those in Table 1a. Thus, free riding problems matter 
more than problems associated with internationally mobile tax bases.  
Also note that, in the absence of capital mobility, the welfare benefit is monotonic 
in b  (see Table 1b). That is, without capital mobility, as the magnitude of international 
spillovers from public goods provision increases, the incentive to free ride on other 
countries’ provision of public goods becomes stronger, and hence the difference between 
the two (Nash and cooperative) tax rates and the gain from cooperation rise 
monotonically.    
 
Result 4. In Tables 2a and 2b, both spillovers are present. The combination of 
international capital mobility ( 0 m≤ < ∞ ) and international public goods ( 0b > ) makes 
the gains for cooperation really big. For instance, compare Table 1a (zero international 
spillover from public goods) to Table 2a (a modest degree of international spillover from 
public goods) by focusing on the same magnitude of international capital mobility; when 
say 1=m , the welfare gain from cooperation is 49 percentage points in Table 2a, while it 
is only 2.7 percentage points in Table 1a. The fact that it is the combination of the two 
spillovers that makes the quantitative difference is confirmed when we compare Tables 
1b (no capital mobility) and 2b (capital mobility), both for varying values of 10 ≤≤ b . 
The benefits are much bigger in Table 2b. Thus, the introduction of international public 
goods into a model with international capital mobility has drastic quantitative welfare 
implications.  
It is important to note however that, for given 0 m≤ < ∞ , the effect of b  is not 
monotonic. This is shown in Table 2b, where we set say 0.1m =  and examine the effects 
from changes in 0 1b≤ ≤ . Up to a critical value of b , denoted as *b , which is around 0.6 
in Table 2b, the higher the magnitude of international spillovers from public goods 
provision, or the worse the free riding problem, the higher the welfare gain from 
cooperation. But after *b , the higher is the value of b , the lower gets the welfare gain 
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from cooperation. This happens because, after *b , as the public good turns from local to 
international, the incentive to compete for mobile tax bases is reduced. Actually, in the 
special case of perfect international spillovers from provided public goods ( 1b = ), the 
incentive to compete for mobile tax bases and the distortions associated with this, are 
completely eliminated. This is shown by the fact that when 1b = , the solution is 
independent of the assumed value of  m  (see e.g. Tables 1b and 2b). This is similar to the 
main result in Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002). Of course, as pointed out by Bjorvatn 
and Schjelderup, there is still undersupply of public goods in the Nash equilibrium due to 
free riding. Therefore, when both international spillovers are present, they do not simply 
add up to a single externality. Their interaction is nonlinear in the sense that the effects of 
b  are nonmonotonic.10 
 
Result 5. We next report the effects of other parameter values. Tables 3a-c report results 
for changing values of population size ( N ), when respectively there is capital mobility 
but no international public goods ( ∞<≤ m0  and 0=b ), there are both capital mobility 
and international public goods ( ∞<≤ m0  and 0>b ) and there are international public 
goods but no capital mobility ( 0>b  and ∞→m ). Results are monotonic. The welfare 
gain from cooperation increases with the size of population. This happens because, in 
symmetric equilibria, coordination problems, or Nash-type inefficiencies, get worse with 
the number of players.11   
 
Tables 3a-c here 
 
Tables 4a-c report what happens when the valuation of the public good (ν ) 
changes. We consider the same three cases as above. Results are again monotonic. In 
Tables 4a-b, with capital mobility, as ν  rises, the welfare gain from cooperation gets 
larger. By contrast, in Table 4c, without capital mobility, as ν  rises, the welfare gain 
from cooperation gets smaller. The idea in Table 4c is that, when the only international 
spillover is from public goods provision, the more we value public goods, the more we 
                                                 
10 We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out to us.      
11 In the case of asymmetric equilibria, the relation is ambiguous. 
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internalize cross-country spillovers even in the absence of cooperation. On the other 
hand, when there is also international capital mobility, as in Tables 4a-b, the dominant 
effect of ν  is through international capital flows.     
 
Tables 4a-c here 
 
Result 6. Combining the above results, it is only the value of 10 ≤≤ b  that produces 
humped-shaped effects on the gain from cooperation, and this happens when both 
international public goods and international capital mobility are present. Results are 
summarized in Tables 5a-b (two different values of mobility costs), 5c-d (two different 
values of population size) and 5e-f (two different values of public goods valuation). In all 
these tables both spillovers are present and we experiment with changing values of 
10 ≤≤ b .  
Notice that the turning point of b  ( *b ) depends on the magnitude of all other 
parameters. Tables 5a-f reveal that the turning point of b  arrives later (i.e. *b  gets 
larger), when international capital mobility increases (i.e. m  gets smaller), the number of 
countries increases (i.e. N  gets bigger), or the valuation of the public good decreases 
(i.e. ν  gets smaller). The intuition behind the effects of m  (see Tables 5a-b) and N  (see 
Tables 5c-d) is as follows. Lower values of m  and/or higher values of N  make 
coordination more desirable or, equivalently, make tax competition costlier. Hence, they 
delay the possibility to offset - via international spillovers from locally provided public 
goods - the distortive effects from tax competition. The intuition behind the effects of ν  
(see Tables 5e-f) is as follows. Both b  and ν  work through the same channel, namely 
international public goods.  Also, as we have seen above, higher values of *0 bb ≤≤  
(given ν ) and higher values of ν  (given b ) work in the same direction increasing the 
welfare loss from tax competition. Hence, before the turning point of b  ( *b ), they can be 
thought as substitutes. This is why as ν  gets smaller, *b  can get larger in Tables 5e-f.   
 
Tables 5a-f here 
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IV. Conclusions, related work and extensions  
 
We provided a quantitative assessment of the welfare benefits from international tax 
policy cooperation. We showed that, once we introduce international public goods to a 
rather standard model of tax competition, the difference in tax policies is reflected to a 
big difference in welfare and hence there are substantial gains from tax cooperation.  Free 
riding on each other’s contribution to international public goods appears to be more 
important and costly than tax competition for mobile tax bases. On the other hand, 
welfare effects are not monotonic in the degree of international spillovers from public 
goods provision.   
          A mentioned already, a paper close to ours is Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002). 
However there are differences. Here we investigated the quantitative implications of 
international public goods for the welfare benefits from international cooperation. By 
contrast, Bjorvatn and Schjelderup focused on the case in which perfect spillovers from 
international public goods eliminate the detrimental effect from tax competition. Besides, 
although this is less important, there are modeling differences. For instance, our model 
allows for various degrees of capital mobility as well as for both current and future 
consumption (this helps us to identify how tax competition for mobile tax bases is good 
for current investment and future consumption).  
It would be interesting to add more types of cross-country spillovers. Here, we 
focused on international capital flows and international public goods. It would also be 
interesting to study the above issues into a fully dynamic general equilibrium neoclassical 
growth model.     
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Table 1 : Either  international capital mobility only, or international public goods only 
 
 
Table 1a: b=0, changing m   
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
m  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t  ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
0.1 0.032 1.03 95.8 3.168 99.3163 0.715 3.5 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.054 
0.2 0.064 1.07 92.63 6.304 99.6282 0.715 3.5 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.050 
0.3 0.095 1.11 89.49 9.403 99.9352 0.715 3.5 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.047 
0.4 0.126 1.14 86.40 12.46 100.236 0.715 3.5 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.044 
0.5 0.156 1.19 83.35 15.46 100.531 0.715 3.5 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.041 
0.6 0.186 1.23 80.36 18.41 100.818 0.715 3.5 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.038 
0.7 0.216 1.27 77.44 21.29 101.097 0.715 3.5 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.035 
0.8 0.244 1.32 74.59 24.09 101.366 0.715 3.5 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.032 
0.9 0.272 1.37 71.83 26.80 101.624 0.715 3.5 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.030 
1.0 0.298 1.43 69.16 29.41 101.871 0.715 3.5 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.027 
m →∞  0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.715 3.5 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.000 
(A=1, v=1.1, e=100, N=15) 
 
 
 
 
Table 1b: m →∞ , changing b 
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
b  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t  ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
0.0 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.95 104.646 0.715 3.5 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.000 
0.1 0.715 3.50 27.54 165.5 210.834 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 0.072 
0.2 0.715 3.50 27.54 262.0 317.022 0.887 8.84 10.31 307.2 350.435 0.105 
0.3 0.715 3.50 27.54 358.6 423.211 0.891 9.17 9.903 420.8 475.011 0.122 
0.4 0.715 3.50 27.54 455.1 529.402 0.893 9.35 9.690 534.3 599.663 0.133 
0.5 0.715 3.50 27.54 551.6 635.593 0.894 9.47 9.558 647.8 724.347 0.140 
0.6 0.715 3.50 27.54 648.2 741.785 0.895 9.55 9.468 761.2 849.049 0.145 
0.7 0.715 3.50 27.54 744.7 847.978 0.896 9.61 9.404 874.6 973.761 0.148 
0.8 0.715 3.50 27.54 841.3 954.175 0.896 9.66 9.355 988.1 1098.48 0.151 
0.9 0.715 3.50 27.54 937.8 1060.39 0.897 9.69 9.316 1101.0 1223.20 0.154 
1.0 0.715 3.50 27.54 1034.0 1166.09 0.897 9.72 9.285 1215.0 1347.93 0.156 
(A=1, v=1.1, N=15, e=100) 
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Table 2 : Both international capital mobility and international public goods 
 
 
Table 2a: b=0.1, changing m 
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
m  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
0.1 0.036 1.04 95.45 8.443 104.769 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 1.158 
0.2 0.071 1.08 91.93 16.79 110.471 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 1.047 
0.3 0.105 1.12 88.46 25.02 116.093 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 0.948 
0.4 0.140 1.16 85.04 33.12 121.621 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 0.859 
0.5 0.173 1.21 81.68 41.06 127.037 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 0.780 
0.6 0.206 1.26 78.41 48.80 132.321 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 0.709 
0.7 0.238 1.31 75.22 56.33 137.453 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 0.645 
0.8 0.269 1.37 72.13 63.61 142.410 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 0.588 
0.9 0.298 1.43 69.16 70.59 147.169 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 0.536 
1.0 0.327 1.49 66.32 77.26 151.706 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 0.490 
m →∞  0.715 3.50 27.54 165.50 210.834 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 0.072 
(A=1, v=1.1, e=100, N=15) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2b: 0.1m = , changing b 
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
b  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
0.0 0.032 1.03 95.80 3.168 99.3163 0.715 3.5 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.054 
0.1 0.036 1.04 95.45 8.443 104.769 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 1.158 
0.2 0.040 1.04 95.00 15.03 111.577 0.887 8.84 10.31 307.2 350.435 2.141 
0.3 0.046 1.05 94.44 23.48 120.315 0.891 9.17 9.903 420.8 475.011 2.948 
0.4 0.053 1.06 93.68 34.73 131.942 0.893 9.35 9.69 534.3 599.663 3.545 
0.5 0.064 1.07 92.63 50.43 148.170 0.894 9.47 9.558 647.8 724.347 3.889 
0.6 0.079 1.09 91.06 73.87 172.397 0.895 9.55 9.468 761.2 849.049 3.925 
0.7 0.110 1.12 88.46 112.6 212.437 0.896 9.61 9.404 874.6 973.761 3.584 
0.8 0.160 1.19 83.35 188.6 291.036 0.896 9.66 9.355 988.1 1098.48 2.774 
0.9 0.300 1.43 69.16 400.0 509.555 0.897 9.69 9.316 1101.0 1223.20 1.401 
1.0 0.715 3.50 27.54 1034.0 1166.09 0.897 9.72 9.285 1215.0 1347.93 0.156 
(A=1, v=1.1,  e=100, N=15) 
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Table 3 :  Effect of population size (N) 
 
 
Table 3a: b=0, changing N 
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
N  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
1 0.715 3.5 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.000 
2 0.394 1.65 59.65 38.71 102.722 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.019 
4 0.146 1.17 84.36 14.47 100.434 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.042 
6 0.0888 1.10 90.12 8.787 99.8742 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.048 
8 0.0637 1.07 92.63 6.304 99.6282 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.050 
10 0.0497 1.05 94.03 4.915 99.4901 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.052 
12 0.0407 1.04 94.93 4.027 99.4018 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.053 
14 0.0345 1.04 95.55 3.410 99.3404 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.053 
16 0.0299 1.03 96.01 2.958 99.2953 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.054 
(A=1, v=1.1, e=100, m=0.1) 
 
 
Table 3b: b=0.1, changing N 
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
N  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
1 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.000 
2 0.425 1.74 56.51 45.93 107.582 0.783 4.60 20.74 82.13 112.605 0.047 
4 0.162 1.19 82.79 20.82 105.869 0.829 5.84 16.11 101.5 129.481 0.223 
6 0.0985 1.11 89.15 14.62 105.329 0.848 6.59 14.18 118.8 146.799 0.394 
8 0.0707 1.08 91.93 11.89 105.084 0.859 7.09 13.10 135.7 164.300 0.564 
10 0.0551 1.06 93.49 10.37 104.945 0.866 7.46 12.40 152.3 181.897 0.733 
12 0.0452 1.05 94.48 9.389 104.856 0.871 7.75 11.90 168.7 199.552 0.903 
14 0.0383 1.04 95.17 8.710 104.794 0.875 7.98 11.54 185.1 217.245 1.073 
16 0.0332 1.03 95.68 8.212 104.748 0.877 8.16 11.25 201.5 234.963 1.243 
(A=1, v=1.1, e=100, m=0.1) 
 
 
Table 3c: m →∞ , changing N 
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
N  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
1 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.000 
2 0.715 3.50 27.54 75.85 112.231 0.783 4.60 20.74 82.13 112.605 0.003 
4 0.715 3.50 27.54 89.64 127.401 0.829 5.84 16.11 101.5 129.481 0.016 
6 0.715 3.50 27.54 103.4 142.571 0.848 6.59 14.18 118.8 146.799 0.030 
8 0.715 3.50 27.54 117.2 157.740 0.859 7.09 13.10 135.7 164.300 0.042 
10 0.715 3.50 27.54 131.0 172.910 0.866 7.46 12.40 152.3 181.897 0.052 
12 0.715 3.50 27.54 144.8 188.079 0.871 7.75 11.90 168.7 199.552 0.061 
14 0.715 3.50 27.54 158.6 203.249 0.875 7.98 11.54 185.1 217.245 0.069 
16 0.715 3.50 27.54 172.4 218.418 0.877 8.16 11.25 201.5 234.963 0.076 
(A=1, v=1.1, e=100, b=0.1) 
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Table 4 :  Effect of public goods valuation (v) 
 
 
Table 4a:  b=0, changing v  
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
v  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t  ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
1.1 0.032 1.03 95.80 3.168 99.3163 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.054 
1.2 0.059 1.06 93.13 5.803 100.159 0.779 4.52 21.12 74.36 111.86 0.117 
1.3 0.081 1.09 90.88 8.029 101.405 0.808 5.20 18.22 76.58 119.419 0.178 
1.4 0.10 1.11 88.95 9.935 102.968 0.825 5.71 16.50 77.79 127.143 0.235 
1.5 0.12 1.13 87.28 11.58 104.784 0.837 6.12 15.35 78.53 134.962 0.288 
1.6 0.13 1.15 85.82 13.02 106.804 0.845 6.44 14.52 79.04 142.842 0.337 
1.7 0.14 1.17 84.54 14.29 108.993 0.851 6.72 13.89 79.4 150.764 0.383 
1.8 0.16 1.18 83.39 15.42 111.322 0.856 6.95 13.39 79.66 158.718 0.426 
1.9 0.17 1.20 82.37 16.43 113.769 0.860 7.15 12.98 79.86 166.695 0.465 
2.0 0.18 1.21 81.45 17.34 116.316 0.863 7.33 12.65 80.02 174.689 0.502 
(A=1, N=15, e=100, m=0.1) 
 
Table 4b: b=0.1 , changing v  
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
v  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t  ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
1.1 0.036 1.04 95.45 8.443 104.769 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 1.158 
1.2 0.065 1.07 92.49 15.47 111.112 0.879 8.25 11.11 193.5 245.442 1.208 
1.3 0.09 1.10 89.99 21.40 117.894 0.881 8.40 10.90 193.7 264.802 1.246 
1.4 0.11 1.13 87.85 26.47 125.020 0.883 8.53 10.72 193.8 284.176 1.273 
1.5 0.13 1.15 85.99 30.86 132.420 0.884 8.64 10.58 193.9 303.560 1.292 
1.6 0.15 1.17 84.37 34.69 140.041 0.885 8.73 10.45 194.0 322.952 1.306 
1.7 0.16 1.19 82.95 38.07 147.844 0.887 8.81 10.35 194.0 342.351 1.316 
1.8 0.17 1.21 81.68 41.07 155.797 0.887 8.88 10.26 194.1 361.755 1.322 
1.9 0.18 1.23 80.54 43.75 163.876 0.888 8.95 10.18 194.1 381.163 1.326 
2.0 0.19 1.24 79.52 46.16 172.063 0.889 9.00 10.11 194.1 400.575 1.328 
(A=1, N=15, e=100, m=0.1) 
 
 
Table 4c: m →∞ , changing v 
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
v  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t  ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
1.1 0.715 3.50 27.54 166.4 211.393 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 0.069 
1.2 0.779 4.52 21.12 179.5 237.517 0.879 8.25 11.11 193.5 245.442 0.033 
1.3 0.808 5.20 18.22 186.1 260.545 0.881 8.40 10.90 193.7 264.802 0.016 
1.4 0.825 5.71 16.50 187.0 279.828 0.883 8.53 10.72 193.8 284.176 0.015 
1.5 0.837 6.12 15.35 188.2 299.658 0.884 8.64 10.58 193.9 303.560 0.013 
1.6 0.845 6.44 14.52 189.6 319.813 0.885 8.73 10.45 194.0 322.952 0.009 
1.7 0.851 6.72 13.89 190.8 339.936 0.887 8.81 10.35 194.0 342.351 0.007 
1.8 0.856 6.95 13.39 191.4 359.719 0.887 8.88 10.26 194.1 361.755 0.006 
1.9 0.860 7.15 12.98 191.6 379.056 0.888 8.95 10.18 194.1 381.163 0.005 
2.0 0.863 7.33 12.65 192.6 399.400 0.889 9.00 10.11 194.1 400.575 0.003 
(A=1, N=15, e=100, b=0.1) 
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Table 5 :  Effects of m, N and v on the critical value of b  
 
 
Table 5a: 0.1m = , changing b 
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
b  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t  ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
0.0 0.032 1.03 95.8 3.168 99.3163 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.054 
0.1 0.036 1.04 95.45 8.443 104.769 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 1.158 
0.2 0.040 1.04 95.00 15.03 111.577 0.887 8.84 10.31 307.2 350.435 2.141 
0.3 0.046 1.05 94.44 23.48 120.315 0.891 9.17 9.903 420.8 475.011 2.948 
0.4 0.053 1.06 93.68 34.73 131.942 0.893 9.35 9.690 534.3 599.663 3.545 
0.5 0.064 1.07 92.63 50.43 148.170 0.894 9.47 9.558 647.8 724.347 3.889 
0.6 0.079 1.09 91.06 73.87 172.397 0.895 9.55 9.468 761.2 849.049 3.925 
0.7 0.110 1.12 88.46 112.6 212.437 0.896 9.61 9.404 874.6 973.761 3.584 
0.8 0.160 1.19 83.35 188.6 291.036 0.896 9.66 9.355 988.1 1098.48 2.774 
0.9 0.300 1.43 69.16 400.0 509.555 0.897 9.69 9.316 1101.0 1223.20 1.401 
1.0 0.715 3.50 27.54 1034.0 1166.09 0.897 9.72 9.285 1215.0 1347.93 0.156 
(A=1, v=1.1, N=15, e=100) 
 
 
 
 
Table 5b: m=0.5 , changing b  
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
b  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t  ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
0.0 0.16 1.19 83.35 15.46 100.531 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.041 
0.1 0.17 1.21 81.68 41.06 127.037 0.876 8.07 11.39 193.3 226.101 0.780 
0.2 0.19 1.24 79.62 72.71 159.824 0.887 8.84 10.31 307.2 350.435 1.193 
0.3 0.22 1.28 77.03 112.8 201.351 0.891 9.17 9.903 420.8 475.011 1.359 
0.4 0.25 1.34 73.66 165.0 255.462 0.893 9.35 9.690 534.3 599.663 1.347 
0.5 0.30 1.43 69.16 235.3 328.362 0.894 9.47 9.558 647.8 724.347 1.206 
0.6 0.36 1.56 62.98 333.3 430.065 0.895 9.55 9.468 761.2 849.049 0.974 
0.7 0.45 1.80 54.47 472.2 574.488 0.896 9.61 9.404 874.6 973.761 0.695 
0.8 0.55 2.22 43.96 656.6 767.023 0.896 9.66 9.355 988.1 1098.48 0.432 
0.9 0.65 2.84 34.26 855.5 976.357 0.897 9.69 9.316 1101.0 1223.20 0.253 
1.0 0.715 3.50 27.54 1034.0 1165.48 0.897 9.72 9.285 1215.0 1347.93 0.157 
(A=1, v=1.1, N=15, e=100) 
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Table 5c: N=10, changing b 
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
b  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t  ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
0.0 0.050 1.05 94.03 4.915 99.4901 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.052 
0.1 0.055 1.06 93.49 10.37 104.945 0.866 7.46 12.4 152.3 181.897 0.733 
0.2 0.062 1.07 92.80 17.17 111.750 0.881 8.38 10.93 225.9 261.574 1.341 
0.3 0.071 1.08 91.93 25.89 120.476 0.886 8.81 10.35 299.1 341.542 1.835 
0.4 0.082 1.09 90.76 37.47 132.067 0.89 9.06 10.04 372.1 421.608 2.192 
0.5 0.099 1.11 89.15 53.6 148.206 0.892 9.22 9.847 445.1 501.718 2.385 
0.6 0.120 1.14 86.74 77.58 172.204 0.893 9.33 9.714 518.1 581.853 2.379 
0.7 0.160 1.19 82.79 116.9 211.557 0.894 9.42 9.617 591.0 662.002 2.129 
0.8 0.240 1.31 75.22 192.5 287.203 0.895 9.48 9.543 664.0 742.160 1.584 
0.9 0.420 1.74 56.51 379.9 474.990 0.895 9.54 9.485 736.9 822.326 0.731 
1.0 0.715 3.50 27.54 689.6 786.640 0.896 9.58 9.438 809.8 902.496 0.147 
(A=1, v=1.1, m=0.1, e=100) 
 
 
 
 
Table 5d: N=20 , changing b  
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
b  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t  ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
0.0 0.024 1.02 96.64 2.337 99.2334 0.715 3.50 27.54 68.96 104.646 0.055 
0.1 0.026 1.03 96.38 7.528 104.685 0.882 8.44 10.84 234.1 270.452 1.583 
0.2 0.029 1.03 96.05 14.01 111.493 0.89 9.10 9.991 388.4 439.407 2.941 
0.3 0.034 1.03 95.63 22.34 120.236 0.893 9.36 9.678 542.4 608.568 4.061 
0.4 0.039 1.04 95.07 33.42 131.876 0.895 9.51 9.516 696.4 777.789 4.898 
0.5 0.047 1.05 94.29 48.91 148.139 0.896 9.60 9.416 850.3 947.036 5.393 
0.6 0.059 1.06 93.13 72.06 172.453 0.897 9.66 9.349 1004 1116.30 5.473 
0.7 0.078 1.08 91.19 110.4 212.752 0.897 9.71 9.300 1158 1285.57 5.043 
0.8 0.120 1.13 87.37 186.3 292.402 0.897 9.74 9.263 1312 1454.84 3.975 
0.9 0.230 1.29 76.38 404.1 521.183 0.898 9.77 9.235 1466 1624.12 2.116 
1.0 0.715 3.50 27.54 1379.2 1545.20 0.898 9.79 9.212 1620 1793.40 0.161 
(A=1, v=1.1, m=0.1, e=100) 
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Table 5e: v=1.2, changing b 
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
b  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t  ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
0.0 0.059 1.06 93.13 5.803 100.159 0.779 4.52 21.12 74.36 111.86 0.117 
0.1 0.065 1.07 92.49 15.47 111.112 0.879 8.25 11.11 193.5 245.442 1.209 
0.2 0.073 1.08 91.68 27.52 124.783 0.888 8.95 10.18 307.3 381.163 2.055 
0.3 0.084 1.09 90.64 43.00 142.324 0.892 9.24 9.818 420.9 517.096 2.633 
0.4 0.097 1.11 89.26 63.57 165.646 0.894 9.41 9.626 534.4 653.096 2.943 
0.5 0.12 1.13 87.34 92.25 198.160 0.895 9.52 9.507 647.8 789.125 2.982 
0.6 0.15 1.17 84.47 135.00 246.600 0.896 9.59 9.427 761.2 925.171 2.752 
0.7 0.19 1.24 79.76 205.30 326.287 0.896 9.65 9.368 874.7 1061.23 2.252 
0.8 0.28 1.40 70.64 341.20 480.365 0.897 9.69 9.323 988.1 1197.29 1.492 
0.9 0.51 2.03 48.19 677.00 861.302 0.897 9.72 9.289 1101 1333.35 0.548 
1.0 0.779 4.52 21.12 1115.40 1360.26 0.897 9.75 9.261 1215 1469.42 0.080 
(A=1, N=15, m=0.1, e=100) 
 
 
 
 
Table 5f: v=1.5 , changing b  
 
 Non Cooperative (Nash)  Cooperative  Gains 
b  nct  1 ( )
ncc t  2 ( )
ncc t  ( )ncg t  ( )ncU t  ct  1 ( )
cc t  2 ( )
cc t  ( )cg t  ( )cU t   
0.0 0.12 1.13 87.28 11.58 104.784 0.837 6.12 15.35 78.53 134.962 0.288 
0.1 0.13 1.15 85.99 30.86 132.42 0.884 8.64 10.58 193.9 303.56 1.292 
0.2 0.15 1.17 84.38 54.89 166.883 0.891 9.17 9.907 307.5 473.393 1.837 
0.3 0.17 1.20 82.32 85.7 211.046 0.894 9.40 9.637 421.0 643.38 2.049 
0.4 0.19 1.24 79.58 126.6 269.642 0.895 9.53 9.491 534.4 813.418 2.017 
0.5 0.23 1.30 75.78 183.3 351.035 0.896 9.62 9.399 647.9 983.479 1.802 
0.6 0.29 1.41 70.16 267.2 471.37 0.897 9.67 9.337 761.3 1153.55 1.447 
0.7 0.38 1.61 61.12 402.5 665.307 0.897 9.72 9.291 874.7 1323.63 0.990 
0.8 0.54 2.16 45.25 641.6 1008.37 0.897 9.75 9.256 988.1 1493.72 0.481 
0.9 0.74 3.89 24.71 971.0 1482.60 0.898 9.78 9.229 1102.0 1663.80 0.122 
1.0 0.837 6.12 15.35 1177.95 1783.062 0.898 9.80 9.207 1215.0 1833.89 0.029 
(A=1, N=15, m=0.1, e=100) 
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A: A Nash equilibrium in national policies is summarized by the tax rate that 
solves equation (7). This non-cooperative tax rate, 0 1nct< < , is unique. Also 
comparative static exercises imply ( , , , , )nct t N b m v e
− + + + += ; thus, the tax rate decreases 
with  the number of countries  and  increases with the strength of international spillovers,  
mobility costs, the weight given to public goods, and the initial endowment.  
Proof: Consider (7). Define the left hand side as 1
(1 )
LHS A e
A t
⎛ ⎞≡ −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
, and the right hand 
side as 
2
2
1 2 (1 )( 1)
(1 ) (1 )
t A t b NRHS v A e
A t t m
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ − −≡ − − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
. Then, taking partials with 
respect to the tax rate, we have 2
1 0
(1 )t
LHS
t
= − <−  and 
2
2 3
1 1 2 (1 )( 1) 0
(1 ) (1 )t
t A b NRHS v
t t m
⎡ ⎤+ − −= − + + <⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦
. Also, from the second-order 
condition of the maximization problem, t tRHS LHS>  for 0 1t< < . Hence, assuming 
existence of a 0 1t< < , there is a unique solution nct  as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
In turn, total differentiation in (7) implies 
2
2
2 ( 1)(1 )
( )
nc
t t
t A tv N b
m m LHS RHS
∂ − −=∂ − , which is positive 
since  ( ) 0t tLHS RHS− > . Also, ( 1)( )
nc
t t
t A v
e LHS RHS
∂ −=∂ − , which is positive for 1v > . 
In addition, 
2
2
1 2 ( 1)(1 )  
(1 ) (1 )
( )
nc
t t t t
t A t N bA e
A t t mt RHS
v LHS RHS v RHS LHS
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ − −− − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟− −∂ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦= =∂ − −  
and 
22 ( 1)
( )
nc
t t
t A tv N
b m LHS RHS
∂ −=∂ −  which are also positive. Finally, 
22 ( 1)
( )
nc
t t
t A tv b
N m LHS RHS
∂ −=∂ − <0, 
since 0 1b< < . 
 
 
Figure 1: Nash tax rate 
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(A=1, e=20, v=1.1, b=0.1, N=10, m=0.2) 
 
Appendix B: A cooperative equilibrium  in national policies is summarized by the tax 
rate that solves equation (8). This cooperative tax rate, 0 1ct< < , is unique. Also 
comparative static exercises imply ( , , , )ct t N b v e
+ + + += ; thus, the tax rate increases with the 
number of countries , the strength of international spillovers, the weight given to public 
goods and the initial endowment, but it is independent of mobility costs.  
Proof : Consider (8). Define the left hand side as 1
(1 )
LHS A e
A t
⎛ ⎞≡ −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
, and the right 
hand side as 2
1[1 ( 1)]  
(1 ) (1 )
tRHS v b N A e
A t t
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞≡ + − − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
. Then, taking partials with 
respect to the tax rate, we have 2
1 0
(1 )t
LHS
t
= − <−  and 
2 3
1 1[1 ( 1) 0
(1 ) (1 )t
tRHS v b N
t t
⎡ ⎤+= − + − + <⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦ . Also, from the second-order condition of 
the maximization problem, we have t tRHS LHS>  for 0 1t< < . Hence, assuming 
existence of a 0 1t< < , there is a unique solution ct  as illustrated in Figure 2.  
RHS
LHS
(RHS,LHS) 
(tnc) 
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In turn total differentiation in (8) implies 0
ct
m
∂ =∂ , 
( ( 1) 1)
( )
c
t t
t A v b
e LHS RHS
∂ + −=∂ − , which is 
positive for 1
1
v
b
> + . 
In addition  
2
1
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ( 1))
( )
c
t t t t
tA e
A t tt RHSb N
v LHS RHS v RHS LHS
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟− −∂ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦= + − =∂ − − , 
2
1
(1 ) (1 )
( 1)
( )
c
t t
tA e
A t tt v N
b LHS RHS
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟− −∂ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦= −∂ −  and 
2
1
(1 ) (1 )
( )
c
t t
tA e
A t tt vb
N LHS RHS
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟− −∂ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦=∂ −  
which are  all positive. 
 
Figure 2: Cooperative tax rate  
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